The anatomy, physiology and pathogenesis of a significant untoward incident by Offredy, M. et al.
1 
 
The anatomy, physiology and pathogenesis of a significant 
untoward incident  
 
 
Maxine Offredy, PhD 
Reader in Primary Health Care, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK 
 
Martin Rhodes  MA (London), MB BS, FRCP. 
Medical Director, Harrow Primary Care Trust, Harrow UK 
 
Yvonne Doyle   BSc, MSc, PGDip(Law), CQSW. 
Acting Interim Head of Department, Harrow Primary Care Trust, Harrow UK 
 
Correspondence to: 
Dr Maxine Offredy 
Centre for Research in Primary and Community Care 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield 
AL10  9AB 
Telephone 01707 284439 
Email: m.v.offredy@herts.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides a structured chronology of an investigation into a significant untoward 
incident in an elderly care ward. Using Reason‟s Swiss Cheese Model, which has become one 
of the dominant paradigms for analysing clinical and patient safety incidents; it charts the 
interplay of national and local policies resulting in unsafe practice.  
 
A qualitative approach was used in this multi-dimensional investigation. This approach aimed 
to discover what actually happened in the specific and related incidents and the underlying 
causes. Thus the anatomy of the incident refers to the structure of staffing, the physiology 
includes the process in place at the time of the incident and the pathogenesis alludes to the 
development of the incident.  
 
The findings report on the patients involved in the incident. It also explores how strategic 
financial directions from the Department of Health impact on staffing levels and training. 
These are contextualised using the concepts of the Swiss Cheese Model to assist 
understanding of how and why the incident occurred. 
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Key points emanating from a learning event are captured to aid 
understanding and the importance of being cognisant of the ever 
present risks in clinical practice. The impact of the investigation 
on staff and the Primary Care Trust are also presented. 
 
The anatomy, physiology and pathogenesis of a significant untoward incident  
 
Introduction 
At 5.00am one morning in November 2007, a member of staff entered a Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) ward for the elderly and found a patient with advanced dementia tied to a chair with a 
bed sheet. The folded sheet was tied around the patient and the chair with the knot behind the 
chair. The matter was reported to the PCT managers. As there was uncertainty surrounding 
the identification of the individual who tied the patient up, all four members of staff who 
were on duty at the time were identified and suspended. Following the procedures laid down 
in the Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) guidelines
1
, the PCT informed the police who 
conducted an investigation over the following three months and referred their findings to the 
Crown Prosecution Service who declined to mount a prosecution after reviewing the 
information presented to them. In February 2008, the matter was referred back to the PCT 
who began its own investigation into the incident and the surrounding circumstances.  
This paper describes the investigation
1
 and the findings; the findings are analysed using 
Reason‟s2 Swiss Cheese Model of system accidents. The chronology of events, learning from 
the investigation and the impact for staff and the PCT are also highlighted. 
 
Methods 
The multi-dimensional investigation comprised interviews, review of ward documentation 
including patients‟ records, oral and written information, site visits and information from the 
police investigation. This approach aimed to discover what actually happened in the specific 
                                            
1
 It should be noted that major national television and radio stations reported the incident when it occurred; 
further reports were published in local newspapers. 
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incident described, any related incidents and the underlying causes. Thus the anatomy of the 
incident refers to the structure of staffing, the physiology includes the process in place at the 
time of the incident and the pathogenesis alludes to the development of the incident. Box 1 
summarises the timeline. 
Structured interviews of staff were mostly tape recorded (with consent from interviewees) 
and undertaken with 33 employees. Contemporaneous notes were made and the transcripts 
were made available to the interviewees. Interviews of patients and relatives were conducted 
by PCT staff trained in sensitive interviewing techniques and who were not front line 
clinicians. The investigator re-interviewed some staff to clarify issues identified in the 
transcripts. 
Documentation was used to identify issues and triangulate findings with other information 
obtained. Guidelines on good practice concerning the protection of vulnerable adults and the 
use of restraint
1,3,4,5,6
 were used as references in the investigation. Restraint is defined in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005
7
 as action that uses, or threatens to use, force to secure the doing of an act 
which the client resists, or restricts the client‟s liberty of movement, whether or not the client resists. 
The project group consisted of the investigating team: managers, directors, the Chairman of 
the PCT, a representative from the Hospital Trust and an outside expert, who met frequently 
throughout the investigation and beyond. It directed the investigation, made decisions about 
staff suspensions and ensured sensitive release of information to patients, relatives and staff. 
Following a report compilation and disciplinary proceedings taken against staff, a Learning 
Event was held by the PCT and included all stakeholders: representatives of the Healthcare 
Commission, a Union Representative, Non-Executive Directors of the PCT, police and the 
POVA Strategy Group. The event was conducted under Chatham House Rule
8
 and consisted 
of a presentation, outlining the incident, investigation and predisposing factors. Small groups 
discussed what had gone well and what might be improved in relation to the investigation, 
staff management and relationships with colleagues. The aim of the exercise was to capture 
lessons from the incident and to disseminate good practice.  
 
Findings 
The first patient  
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Patient C was an elderly patient with advanced dementia who was found by a member of staff 
tied to a chair. The four staff members on the night shift denied tying Patient C to the chair or 
that the patient was tied to a chair.  They further maintained that a sheet was placed around 
Patient C for warmth as there were no blankets available.   
Other patients 
The investigation identified a further four patients who were treated similarly, two of whom 
were deceased. They shared a history of confusion and disruptive behaviour. 
Multidisciplinary team discussions about one of these patients had concluded that, for a test 
period of two weeks, the patient should be allowed to sit in a chair with a loosely-held 
restraining seat belt, after which this would be reviewed by the Consultant at regular 
intervals. Staff interviewed had observed this restraint, but apart from the ward manager, 
none had recognised that this was part of a specific and agreed strategy that was under regular 
review as there was not a care plan concerning restraint in the records. 
Relatives of the two deceased patients reported that their relatives had told them that they 
were tied to their beds. One relative witnessed the restraint of their family member whilst 
other relatives observed patients being restrained by tying to furniture. The case notes of one 
patient recorded that a patient‟s relative had asked that the patient be restrained in a chair but 
a nurse refused to do so on the grounds that it was unethical. The investigations established 
that the effect of inappropriate restraint on the patients could not be demonstrably ascertained 
because of the cognitive impairment of the patients. Nonetheless, the possible effects of such 
behaviour, including ethical issues and the impact this behaviour may have on the patients 
themselves, relatives and friends were of concern to the investigating team. 
 Staff denial 
Some members of staff confirmed that these patients were restrained with either bed sheets or 
men‟s braces while others deny witnessing, or knowing of, patients who had been restrained. 
Those nurses who had witnessed restraint of patients did not report the practice. One health 
care assistant thought that restricting movement by tightly applying a sheet and placing a 
table close to the patient was acceptable practice. 
Analysis 
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The analysis presents the predisposing factors of the incident and their fit with the Swiss 
Cheese model
2
 (Figure 1). Box 2 highlights main points of the learning event.  
The basic premise of the Swiss Cheese model implies that hazards or errors are prevented 
from occurring by a series of barriers and safeguards. In an ideal organisation the safeguards 
and barriers would be intact. However, Reason
9
 postulates that most organisations are akin to 
slices of a Swiss cheese with many holes. Unlike a Swiss cheese, these holes continually shift 
their position, opening and closing in different areas. The existence of holes in a „slice‟ does 
not normally result in an accident. Accidents occur when, by chance, the holes in many 
„slices‟ align to allow a route for the hazard to reach the patient, causing harm. 
Each barrier has unintended weaknesses or holes (Figure1). Holes in the defence occur 
because of two reasons: active failures and latent conditions. Active failures refer to unsafe 
acts committed by individuals at the „sharp end‟ of the system (pilots, air traffic controllers, 
maintenance workers, doctors, nurses) whose actions can result in immediate adverse 
consequences. Latent conditions are strategic misjudgements or poor decisions usually taken 
at senior management level of the organisation or within society, away from the front line and 
who are said to be at the „blunt end‟ of the system. Latent conditions have a further three 
layers: organisational influences, unsafe supervision and preconditions for unsafe acts.  The 
following sections contextualise these concepts within the current investigation. 
Latent conditions 
(i) Organisational influences 
The latent conditions identified in this investigation include strategic direction from the 
Department of Health for Trusts to achieve financial balance or breakeven
10
 in the financial 
year. Against a background to achieve financial balance this affected staffing levels and 
training issues. The PCT in this investigation had significant financial problems and was 
required to produce a robust recovery plan to achieve financial balance over the shortest 
possible period. 
Recovery Plan 
The Trust Board approved the Recovery Plan at its meeting in June 2006 when it was 
described as being “non-negotiable”. It was subsequently approved by the Strategic Health 
6 
 
Authority. The Plan resulted in a sudden cut of more than 20% in the nursing budgets for the 
Care of the Elderly Wards. Notes made by a PCT staff in May 2006, suggested that no risk 
assessment had been made of its action. The Recovery Plan had small sections on risk and its 
mitigation; this had been evaluated by three PCT directors alone. The PCT‟s Risk Register 
does not contain information to suggest that the risk to patient safety was monitored 
following the implementation of the Recovery Plan. Enquiries by the investigator to 
appropriate personnel in the PCT did not uncover any information to suggest that any such 
evaluation had occurred. Consequently strategic decisions such as the reduction in nursing 
budgets, the lack of identification of risk management and the lack of wider discussions about 
risks and its evaluation are latent failures and predisposing factors which impacted on the 
patients and staff 15 months later.  
A Health Impact Assessment day was held in June 2006, after the Recovery Plan had been 
signed off, which involved 19 people including practicing clinicians. The issue of not filling 
vacant posts was judged by far to be the greatest risk of the whole Recovery Plan. The risk 
was to be managed by a service redesign and one of the four Care of the Elderly wards that 
were managed by the PCT was closed.  
Between June 2006 and November 2007 all five Executive Directors moved on from the 
PCT. The investigator judged that the „organisational memory‟ was affected by this, 
including monitoring the consequences of the Recover Plan. 
(ii) Unsafe supervision 
Staffing levels 
The staffing levels for the 26-bed ward at the time of the incident were meant to be two 
trained nurses and four Health Care Assistants during the day and evening shifts, and two 
trained nurses and two Health Care Assistants on the night shift.  The investigator was told 
that there are no national guidelines as to staffing levels on Care of the Elderly Wards, but 
local comparisons suggest that this complement of staffing was low. Differing opinions exist 
as to how often the ward was understaffed. It is undisputed that there was heavy reliance on 
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„bank‟ staff2 to cover periods when there was staff shortage and when patients required 1 to1 
care – as in the case of the first patient.  
Reason‟s2 model takes into account predisposing factors which might lead to an incident. In 
this case, the reliance on bank staff is viewed as being both latent and active predisposing 
factor. The latent failure has been discussed above in relation to financial instability. 
However, some responsibility for active failure rests with the individual because of the need 
for their physical and emotional stamina to work long hours. Errors in their delivery of care 
are more likely to occur; it is at such times that shortcuts might well take place 
2
. The data 
showed that some staff drew the attention of senior managers to the high use of bank staff 
and poor staffing levels. In terms of the model, the individuals to whom the staff had voiced 
their concerns inadvertently allowed unsafe supervision of both staff and patients, thus giving 
the impression of condoning poor staffing levels. 
(iii)Precondition for unsafe acts 
Training 
The data showed that only two staff had received training on restraint or protection of 
vulnerable adults. Of the two, one staff received training in a previous employment and the 
other undertook training in her own time. Interviews with some staff showed that lack of 
training was a predisposing factor to their substandard practice as some had poor 
understanding and knowledge of what constituted restraint.  
Active failures 
Unsafe acts 
An interview with a member of staff highlighted that reduced staffing levels resulted in sub-
optimal quality of care for patients. Examples given were lack of attention to dietary, 
continence and mobility needs. Poor team communication was highlighted by staff although 
they were encouraged to discuss issues at monthly meetings. Minutes of meetings were held 
on computer but could not be accessed by the investigator because of suspension of staff. 
                                            
2
 Bank staff were nurses engaged by the PCT to work shifts on an as-needed basis.  Bank staff may have held 
substantive contracts of employment with the PCT, or may have been engaged only under the terms of a bank 
staff letter of registration. 
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Staff appraisals had been undertaken although not all within a 12 month period. Some were 
judged to be superficial by the investigator; only one interviewee identified any learning or 
professional development plan that emerged from the appraisal. Lack of support for training 
was also an issue of concern for some staff. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Swiss Cheese model demonstrates that the events outlined in this paper do not occur in 
isolation but as a result of certain pre conditions being breached. Some of the issues to 
emerge from this investigation include non-technical skills, for example, social or interactive 
skills and situation awareness skills. These skills relate to the individual per se and are 
required in team and individual situations. They should be part of an induction programme so 
that the concept of patient safety, respect, dignity and management are grounded in practice. 
 
Managerial procedures for recruiting staff were curtailed because of the financial position of 
the PCT which in turn was responding to government policy. These latent conditions and 
predisposing factors lay dormant for many months before impacting with other failures to 
produce unacceptable nursing care. Analysis of error in any complex organisation requires 
investigation into both active failures that happen to the individual at the front line and the 
latent failures of policy, procedures and culture. Reason‟s2 Swiss cheese model allows 
organisations to find holes in their defences and to develop mechanisms to address the 
underlying structural weaknesses. 
 
The PCT‟s written procedures view suspension to be a neutral act.  However, this was not 
perceived as such by the staff. Suspension together with the involvement of the police in the 
investigation was not conducive to a climate of openness.  This made investigation into the 
circumstances of the first patient and the surrounding issues difficult. In particular, although 
there is clear evidence of patients being restrained, no member of staff admitted to doing this 
or knew anyone who had done this. In the event, the investigation resulted in disciplinary 
procedures being applied to four members of staff and a further member was reported to their 
professional body. 
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The team interviewing the patients and their relatives found that the majority said they were 
satisfied with the care received on the ward. Some patients and relatives were highly 
complimentary about the services provided. However, there were some who said they were 
not satisfied with the care delivered but would not complain because their relative could be 
re-admitted onto the ward.  This mixture of reviews would suggest that the quality of care on 
the ward was variable. Further, little consideration appears to have been given to the impact 
of such actions as restraint on people with dementia themselves. There appears to be an 
underlying issue among staff and management that behavioural disturbances in people with 
dementia are indicators on unmet needs and would indicate a failure to address provision of 
training in best practice in dementia care.  If staff have not been trained well in 
communicating with people with dementia, they are unable to respond appropriately to their 
needs and staff are unable to understand what needs the person with dementia is 
communicating through behavioural symptoms.  This makes poor practice not only likely, but 
inevitable.  Poor practice will perpetuate itself. 
A pertinent issue for nurses (and other health care professionals) to bear in mind is that their 
practice decisions have an ethical component.  The component is made up of a number of 
principles and includes: avoiding harm, assessing the consequences of action, autonomy and 
rights and values and beliefs
1
. Tension arise in the decision about applying restraint because 
to do otherwise could also cause harm. Thus the consequences of using or withholding 
restraint need to be carefully considered by determining the potential benefit and harm. Two 
of the principles laid down by the Mental Capacity Act 2005
7
 states that: 
An act done or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity 
must be done, or made, in their best interests.  
 
 Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the purpose for 
which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the 
person‟s rights and freedom of action. 
The investigation team found that the actions of some of the nurses breached these values 
when treating elderly patients with dementia. Implicit in this behaviour is the lack of person-
centred care, a lack of understanding about the impact of dementia on patients and a lack of 
skills in effective communication by staff when working with people with dementia. 
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Incidents such as those described in this paper do not occur in isolation of context in which 
practitioners work, including the culture and climate of the organisation. Recent thinking 
suggests they occur due to a combination of issues in individuals and systems
2
. Thus the 
allegations were investigated in the context of their wider settings. There is little controversy 
among clinicians about the importance of good clinical practice, but the consensus of good 
clinical practice dissipates when errors occur, making investigation of incidents difficult. It is 
imperative to know, understand and learn from the ever-present risks in clinical practice. 
 
 
 Summary 
 
There is very clear evidence that the first patient was tied to a chair with a sheet in November 
2007 and possibly on previous nights and this was performed in a way contrary to National 
Guidelines on restraint
1
. There is no evidence that points to which particular individual or 
individuals were responsible for participating in restraining patients.  There is evidence that 
some staff knew about this unacceptable practice but failed to manage or report this 
behaviour. Knowledge of policy and practice of restraint was poor: some senior staff did not 
recognise that the use of a seat belt was restraint. This was partly due to the lack of training 
on this subject, but also about the condition of dementia, its impact and the communication 
skills of staff. There are lessons that were learnt concerning the latent conditions that 
predisposed to the incident, such as sensitivity of the needs of patients and their relatives 
throughout the investigation, apologies were given and feedback was given to them before 
the official report; interviewers were specially trained and the timely response to the incident.  
The events described in this paper are both of national and international significance. 
Extensive recommendations (http://www.harrowpct.nhs.uk) were provided for different 
groups identified in the investigation: individual nurses, ward staff, medical consultants and 
the Trust. 
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Box 1 Summary of timeline  
November 2007 
 
Formal report of incident 
Staff suspensions 
Significant Untoward Incident  (SUI) reported to NHS London 
Referral to police 
Referral to Protection Of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) strategy group 
 
February 2008 
 
Police conclude criminal investigation (No further action) 
Medical Director (MD) appointed to carry out investigation 
MD hears evidence to suggest multiple abuse 
Chief Executive establishes Project team 
 
March 2008 
 
Action Plan devised and regularly updated 
 
March/June 2008 
 
Regular meetings of the Project Team to review evidence/ plan next steps 
Support provided for patients and staff 
Consultation/discussion with key stakeholders 
Progress reports and attendance at POVA strategy group meetings 
First draft report circulated 
 
August/September 2008 
 
Final SUI report and Executive Summary produced 
Learning event. 
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The Swiss Cheese Model: anatomy 
of error
PCTs must break even
Secretary of State (DH 2007)
SHA signs off PCT recovery plan
Risk management of recovery plan
Patients 
inappropriately 
restrained
Management supervision of ward
Staff training on POVA
 
Figure 1 Swiss Cheese Model (Reason 1990). 
13 
 
Box 2  Key points arising from the learning event 
What went well What could have been improved 
The immediate response to the index 
incident in November 2007; the 
communication at the time of the incident 
when patients and the family of the index 
patient were informed of what had 
happened. An SUI was called in line with 
policy.  The police were called to 
investigate whether a criminal action had 
taken place to determine whether any 
prosecution should take place.  
Information was passed to all the 
stakeholders. 
The local Protection of Vulnerable Adult 
(POVA) strategy group which met and 
approved the strategy adopted by the 
PCT after it was clear that there were 
several patients involved.  This enabled 
communication with the stakeholders and 
provided a conduit to track information 
There was sensitivity to the needs of 
patients and their relatives throughout 
the investigation, apologies were given 
and feedback was given to them before 
the official report was issued.   
The introduction of a helpline for patients 
and their relatives. 
 
The interviewers interviewed the patients 
and their relatives after having been 
trained. 
 
The investigation was focussed on the 
incident itself and the predisposing 
factors. 
Some of the issues that the investigation 
had highlighted were discussed and it 
was judged that they should be 
emphasised.  This included: 
 
 the need to prioritise patient safety 
 the lack of identified patient safety 
issues being recorded on the risk 
register 
 lack of education and training of 
the staff 
 the isolation of the night staff.  It 
was believed that unannounced 
visits from senior staff in the 
evening and at night can be well 
received and revealing 
 the overuse of bank staff 
 fatigue of staff who frequently did 
double shifts 
 culture of blame perceived by the 
staff although a criminal 
investigation severely limits the 
ability to be open. 
There was a time delay before it was 
determined that the restraint of more than 
one patient had occurred.  This was 
because of the priority given to the 
criminal investigation.  It was thought that 
as in child abuse cases, a criminal and 
SUI investigation could be carried out 
simultaneously. 
There were issues about storing 
information when it was received which 
should have been recognised at the 
outset and provision for and a clear filing 
strategy developed and implemented. 
 
There was sometimes delay when there 
was a need for legal advice at particular 
points.  Although communication was 
good with the solicitors they were not in a 
position to provide instant answers 
14 
 
without notification. 
 
Impact of investigation 
 
Staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PCT 
POVA training and regular update are 
part of personal development for relevant 
staff 
 
The PCT’s disciplinary procedures were 
applied to four members of staff 
 
One member of staff was referred to their 
professional body 
 
 
 
The thorough investigation by the PCT did 
not result in judicial prosecution 
 
The PCT reviewed and amended its 
governance arrangements 
 
Improved use of the Risk Register and 
reporting arrangements have been put in 
place. 
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